Dela Torre v. Comelec

G.R. No. 121592 (July 5, 1996)

Facts:

Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre filed a petition for certiorari seeking to nullify two resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) regarding his disqualification from running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the May 8, 1995 elections. The first resolution, dated May 6, 1995, declared Dela Torre disqualified based on Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991), which disqualifies individuals sentenced by final judgment for offenses involving moral turpitude or punishable by imprisonment of one year or more within two years after serving their sentence.

The COMELEC found that Dela Torre had been convicted by the Municipal Trial Court for violating the Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. 1612) in Criminal Case No. 14723, with the conviction becoming final on January 18, 1991. The COMELEC concluded that the nature of the offense involved moral turpitude, thus justifying his disqualification.

Dela Torre's motion for reconsideration was denied in a second resolution dated August 28, 1995. In his motion, he argued that the probation granted to him on December 21, 1994, which suspended the execution of his sentence, rendered Section 40(a) inapplicable to his case.

Legal Issues:

1. Does the crime of fencing involve moral turpitude?
2. Does the grant of probation affect the applicability of Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code?

Arguments:

• Petitioner’s Argument: Dela Torre contended that his conviction for fencing should not disqualify him under Section 40(a) because he was granted probation, which he argued suspended the legal consequences of his conviction. He maintained that the nature of the crime did not involve moral turpitude, thus he should not be disqualified from running for office.

• Respondent’s Argument: The COMELEC argued that fencing is inherently a crime involving moral turpitude, as it involves knowingly dealing in stolen property, which reflects a depraved moral character. They asserted that the grant of probation does not negate the conviction itself, which remains valid and disqualifying under the Local Government Code.

Court’s Decision and Legal Reasoning:

The Supreme Court dismissed Dela Torre's petition and affirmed the resolutions of the COMELEC. The Court held that the offense of fencing does indeed involve moral turpitude. It reasoned that the elements of the crime, particularly the requirement that the accused must know or should have known that the property was stolen, demonstrate a malicious intent that is contrary to societal norms of honesty and justice.

The Court further clarified that not all crimes involve moral turpitude, but crimes that are mala in se (inherently immoral) typically do. The Court emphasized that the determination of whether a crime involves moral turpitude is a factual question that considers the circumstances surrounding the offense. In this case, the Court found that Dela Torre's conviction for fencing met the criteria for moral turpitude.

Regarding the issue of probation, the Court ruled that while probation suspends the execution of the sentence, it does not affect the validity of the conviction itself. The Court noted that a judgment of conviction becomes final upon the application for probation, thus the disqualification under Section 40(a) remained applicable.

Significant Legal Principles Established:

1. The definition of moral turpitude includes acts that are inherently immoral and contrary to societal norms, and the determination of whether a crime involves moral turpitude is often a question of fact.
2. A conviction remains valid and disqualifying under the Local Government Code even if the execution of the sentence is suspended due to probation.